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Abstract 
While link capacities of urban transportation networks possess inherent randomness due to varying reasons, conventional 
models assume that the designed link capacities prevail. The recent developments in reliable network design require the link 
capacities to be treated as stochastic. It is, however, laborious to collect data to explicitly model stochastic nature of link 
capacities. It is also hard to relate the link-level randomness and system-level performance. A smarter alternative is to treat 
link capacities as random variables and search for probability distributions over such random variables which would effect in 
a worst case scenario. One can then assess the performance of the network at this worst case and comment on the reliability of 
the network. This paper formulates and solves a worst case stochastic link capacity degradation problem. The randomness 
involved has been modeled as the mixed strategy profile of a player in a fictitious game. The players of the game  a friend 
who plays for the network and a foe who plays against the network  compete each other to minimize and maximize the 
expected system travel time (ESTT). The foe has been modeled as an intelligent player, who knows that the network users 
would settle to probabilistic user equilibrium (PUE). The foe is also cautious of the friend  presence who would try to assign 
flows system-optimally, thereby minimizing the ESTT. The game has been formulated as a multi-level optimization equation. 
Different algorithms which can use the results from this methodology as inputs to establish most probable worst case states of 
the network have been discussed. A planner can input the results from this problem into some of the existing algorithms to 
identify the most probable worst case states, and the probabilities associated with these states, thus defining the reliability of 
the network.  
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1. Introduction 
 Urban road networks are frequently subject to link capacity degradations due to traffic incidents, flooding, 
storming, snowing, road space reallocations, road space infiltrations etc. and their combinations. The travel time 
increases due to such degradations. It is hence important while performing network design, to account for the 
randomness involved in capacity realization on each link. On one hand, there are conventional models which do 
not account for such stochastic nature resulting in suboptimal decisions while designing transportation networks 
(Ng & Waller, 2009). On the other hand, studies on network reliability usually assume knowledge on probability 
distributions over link performance (Bauer et al., 1987; Bell, 2000; Asakura, Hato & Kashiwadani, 2003; 
Marseguerra et al., 2005). However, such data are difficult to acquire given the deficiency of organized and 
methodical collected day-to-day data. Even in the presence of such data, it is possible that it is temporally 
unstable (Bell, 2000). 
A better option is to treat link capacities as random variables and examine for probability distributions over 
such random variables that would effect in a worst case scenario. Defining such a worst case scenario is a 
complex issue, since a transportation network scenario involves both the infrastructural attributes, as well as the 
behavioral responses of the network user. Urban transportation networks are frequently used by a group of 
learning travelers. Therefore, a greater probability of capacity degradation on one link will affect the route choice 
behavior of commuters who are conscious of other paths. Thus, to define a worst case scenario, one has to play 
around with different combinations of link capacity distributions, and the resulting flow pattern response from the 
users. It follows that the situation can be modeled as a competition between two entities. 
This paper envisages such a game which would result in an equilibrium, at which the worst case scenario gets 
defined. At the equilibrium, such a strategy profile, which would maximize the utility of a capacity degrader, can 
be obtained. The following section details the structure of the game, the players involved, their strategies and 
corresponding utilities. It also briefs on the uniqueness of the objective function at the equilibrium. In Section 3 
the problem is formulated as a multi-level optimization problem. Section 4 gives the solution methodology 
adopted and presents example results on sample networks. Section 5 outlines how to establish network reliability 
from these results and section 6 gives the conclusions and future research scope. 
2. Worst Case as the Equilibrium of a Game 
As implied in the previous section, definition of a scenario on a transportation network has two dimensions  
the state of infrastructure and a corresponding routing scheme. The state of infrastructure is to be modeled as 
 with associated probability 
distributions. Given a routing scheme, such probability distributions on link capacities have to be defined that the 
network under-performs. Meanwhile, observing such distributions the planner searches for a best reply by 
assigning flows so as to improve the network performance. Thus, the game is between players who have goals 
contradicting in nature. 
2.1. The players 
We call the entity who intends to worsen the network performance as foe to the network. Note that this entity 
foe. In similar works, such entities are also referred to as demons, evil entities etc. With the goal to worsen the 
performance of the network as a whole, the foe plays its part independantly on each of its links. Naturally, one 
can envisage a presence of as many foes as the number of the links on the network, who would form a grand 
coalition, as observed by Szeto (2011), since each of them wants the network to be as worse as possible. Thus, 
when we refer to the  foe, it is the coalition that we mean. the action 
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set of all members involved in the grand coalition. To properly estimate the worst case, it has to be assumed that 
the foe is wise enough to know that for any probability distributions that the foe would assign on link capacities: 
There exist a competitor who would intervene with a best reply to better the network performance as much as 
possible  
In spite of the existence of such a competitor, the network users would ultimately settle to probabilistic user 
equilibrium (PUE) 
PUE is an equilibrium pattern that commuters would settle to, when the link capacities are subject to 
stochastic degradations (Lo & Tung, 2003). The travelers learn the variability in the mean travel times of 
different routes and seek to minimize it. Habitual route choice equilibrium is another name for this type of 
equilibrium(Siu & Lo, 2008).  
The competitor to the foe is the friend, who has an immediate 
virtual entity, though recognizeable as a network controller who beholds a bi  
system optimal (SO) assignment. 
2.2. The strategy sets 
The alternative actions that the players take to achieve their respective goals forms their pure strategy set. The 
foe (each member in the grand coalition) would choose from different levels of degradation on link capacities 
that they can choose from. The friend can have different routes between an origin-destination (OD) pair as their 
pure strategies. What would subsequently matter, are the mixing of these pure strategies. For the foe, the mixing 
of pure strategies would mean the definition of probability distribution to each level of link degradation. For the 
friend, it would mean the proportioning of OD demand to various available routes. 
2.3. The utilities 
The utility of each player of a game is the payoff that the player obtains by selecting a strategy, given that the 
other players have selected certain strategy. The utility for the friend will be higher if the network performance is 
better. The system travel time (STT) is a popular index of network performance. Under stochastic conditions of 
capacity, using the concept of utility theory, the probabilistically weighted sum on STT  the expected system 
travel time (ESTT) disutility  lower the ESTT, higher is the associated 
utility for the friend. The friend will thus mix strategies to ascertain that the ESTT is as low as possible. Note that 
this ESTT  
thereby performing SO assignment. 
pture the 
wisdom as described in the previous section. ESTT. Higher the 
ESTT 
tries to hold that the network users are as near an equilibrium as possible. By this, the foe ascertains the stability 
of the worst case  if no user gains by switching the route choice then it is more likely that the situation holds. 
2.4. The equilibrium and its uniqueness 
At equilibrium a certain mix up of scenarios by all players exists, such that no single player has any incentive 
to unilaterally changing the mix up. The equilibrium in this context: 
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The ESTT will be at a maximum possible level ESTT*, such that the foe has no other potential probability 
distribution that can cause a higher value than ESTT* 
There will be no potential routing scheme available with the friend that can decrease the ESTT* 
The ESTT* will be stable   with users having minimal incentive 
to switch routes 
The third point goes with the assumption that the foe is wise to know that the users will finally set into PUE. 
For the users to have minimal incentive from switching routes, it is required that at ESTT* the system is in PUE. 
At PUE, there is minimal difference in mean travel times on alternative paths. 
Since no player has any incentive to switch strategies, the equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium (NE). 
Particularly, it is a case of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), as the players are apportioning their 
strategies  the foe by defining probability distributions on link degradation levels and the friend by 
proportioning the OD demand to various available routes. Assuming two things  that the network is congested, 
and that the travel time on a link depends on the flow  it is not possible for this game to reach equilibrium 
when the players precisely play pure strategies. For instance, the friend playing a pure strategy would mean that 
only one route will be selected to assign whole of the OD demand. It can thus be safely assumed that there is no 
best response pure strategy for SO routing in congested networks. As in the absence of pure strategy NE, the 
game has a nontrivial mixed strategy (Ido & Roth, 1998), which confirms the uniqueness of MSNE. This eludes 
any apprehensions regarding uniqueness of ESTT* on congested networks. 
3. The Multi-level Optimization Formulation 
Here, the game envisaged in the previous section is formulated as a multi-level optimization formulation. The 
transportation network has been considered as a digraph G (N ,A    ) where N      is the set of nodes and 
A    is the set of arcs. R   denotes the set of origins and S    denotes the set of destinations. Below are the 
additional notations related to the formulation: 
 
 qrs   : trip demand between the origin r and destination s,( r R  s S  ) 
 ij   : directed link incident to node i and j; ij A 
 fij   : flow on link ij 
rs
ijf     : flow specific to origin-destination pair rs on link ij 
 Tij   : free-flow travel time on link ij 
 Cij   : random capacity on link ij 
ijC    : maximum capacity on link ij 
 K   : set of all link-level degraded states k  
k
ijp    : probability that capacity of link ij is in the degraded state k  
ijij fc   : link cost function  link travel time as a function of flow 
 
 The upper level problem is a bi-level problem in itself.  
k
ij
ij k
ij
k
ijijp
pfcfz
k
ij
max    (1) 
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Subject to: 
 rsfp ij
k
ijrspkij
,,min  (2) 
  Subject to: 
 
k
k
ij Kkijp ,,1  (3) 
 kijpkij ,,10  (4) 
Where  is the root mean square error of the mean travel times of all routes linking the OD pair from rs  
the minimum among all mean travel times of all routes between the OD pair.  
 
rsPpTTETETE rsp
rs ,,,,...,,min 321  (5) 
 
Where E(Tp) is the expected value of travel time on route p between OD pair rs. The probabilities of degraded 
capacity levels on every link are decision variables in the objective function. So, in terms of the decision 
variables, we may write: 
 
rspfcTE rskij
k ij
ij
k
ij
rs
ij ,,,  (6) 
 
rsTE
n
rs ,1   (7) 
Where rsij , is a binary variable  one if link ij is on route between the OD pair rs, and zero otherwise. n is 
the number of routes available. 
payoff has two parts  The ESTT, which is constrained on the assumption of PUE. PUE constraint is 
given in Equation (2), which minimizes   a function of the probability values at each capacity level. Such a 
formulation would ensure that the ESTT will get maximized, simultaneously minimizing the difference of each 
 travel times. Hence, there is a control on the upper 
level problem against deviation from PUE. The constraint in Equation (3) maintains that the probabilities sum up 
to one and that in Equation (4) maintains logic on individual probability values. 
The lower level problem has the ESTT as the objective function value: 
 
k
ij
k ij
ij
k
ijijf
pfcfz
ij
min'   (8) 
 
Subject to: 
j j
rs
rs
rs
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rs
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rs
ij ijff   (10) 
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The constraint in Equation (9) assigns whole OD demand to the network, and maintains the flow conservation 
at all intermediate nodes. Equation (10) gives a definitional constraint that relates the OD pair specific flows to 
total link flows. 
The multi-level optimization formulation is the representation of a game with finite number of strategies. 
Since it is definite that a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium will exist (Nash, 1951), the existance of an optimal 
solution is certain. However, its uniqueness will depend on the choice of link-cost function. 
4. Numerical Examples 
These instances are prepared to demonstrate the formulation on a toy network.  Networks as shown in Fig 1 
have been considered. For networks with single OD pair, as there is only one value for , it may be supplied to 
the maximization equation (Equation (1)) as a denominator, thus nullifying Equation (2). The upper level 
problem may hence be simplified for cases with single OD pair. The cost function used in the examples is the 
BPR cost function  a popular cost function used for analysis of urban transportation networks. It is: 
ij
k
ij
ij
ijijij
k
ij C
f
Tfc   (11) 
The values of the parameters and are assumed 0.15 and 4 respectively. On each link, three levels of 
capacity are taken  full, half and one-third. The full capacity is considered to be 7.5 on all links. For both the 
toy networks, OD demand of 10 is considered. Using the above setting, both networks converged to Nash 
equilibrium. The ESTT of both networks at the equilibrium are presented in Table 1. The difference between 
deviations from the PUE in successive iterations, captured using the root mean square error converges more 
quickly for the two-linked network than the three-linked network. The convergence of is illustrated in Fig 2. 
The equilibrium probability values associated with the different capacity levels are given in Table 2. Note that 
these values are the link-wise capacity reliability values as they give that the probability that the link is in certain 
state at equilibrium.  
Table 1. Expected system travel time at equilibrium 
Network ESTT 
Sample network 1 55.54 
Sample network 2 72.91 
  
  
Fig. 1. (a) sample network 1; (b) sample network 2 
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Fig. 2. nth and (n-1)th iterations (a) on sample network 1; (b) on sample network 2
Table 2.Link level capacity reliability values at equilibrium
5. Establishing Network Reliability
At the link level, a set of worst case capacity reliability values get defined in the process of finding ESTT*. At 
than a predefined tolerance. The definition has two dimensions:
To explicitly define the tolerance on the network performance index
To calculate the probabilities associated with each level of this performance index
Considering the case of network with stochastic capacity levels on links, ESTT is a considerable performance
index. The tolerance level on ESTT can be ESTT* the one at the worst case. Since ESTT* depends on the
network topology, link attributes and the demand level, for any improvement or alteration on the network, it can
Network Link Level of capacity Probability
Sample network 1
Short 
Full 0
Half 0
One-third 1
Long
Full 1
Half 0
One-third 0
Sample network 2
Short 
Full 0.081
Half 0.915
One-third 0.004
Medium
Full 0
Half 0
One-third 1
Long
Full 1
Half 0
One-third 0
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be quantified. Also, while computing ESTT*, we obtain probabilities of different states on each link of the 
network. Once these probabilities are known, there exist different algorithms to assess the most probable states of 
the network:  
The ORDER-M algorithm (Chiou & Li, 1986) 
The rooted tree algorithm (Yang & Kubat, 1989) 
Generate algorithm  
Transformed K-shortest paths algorithm  (Gomes, Craveirinha & Lúcia, 2002) 
 
A detailed review on various methods to find most probable states can be found in Colbourn & Harms (1993). 
Once the most probable states and the corresponding probabilities have been enumerated, arranging these states 
in the descending order of their respective ESTT values, and accumulating the respective probability values up to 
that of ESTT*, the probability of system being in a state better than ESTT* can be determined. A planner can thus 
use these results to quantify reliability of the transportation network. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper develops game-theoretic formulation for worst case stochastic link capacity degradation problem. 
The primary contribution of this paper might be that it introduces link-specificity to scenarios, against the 
conventional game-theoretic formulations that limit to network-wide scenarios. The worst case has been modeled 
as the equilibrium outcome of a game between two entities  one playing for and the other playing against the 
network. The idea of probabilistic user equilibrium  popular in the case of capacity stochastic networks, is 
incorporated, and it is maintained that the equilibrium of the envisaged game does not deviate too far from this. 
At the equilibrium, they converge to the worst case expected system travel time. A multi-level optimization 
equation is formulated to solve for the equilibrium of the game. This paper also briefs the various ways in which 
its results may be employed to study transportation network reliability. 
 This paper opens up some immediate research perspectives. Firstly, this paper is limited to incorporating 
stochastic nature of supply. Stochastic nature of demand has to be included to justly estimate the worst case. 
Secondly, Even though the existence of such an equilibrium is definite as discussed in this paper, its uniqueness 
would depend on the topological form of the cost function involved. This is left to future studies. Finally, in case 
of multiple origin destination networks, the upper level problem grows complex. Constructing efficient global 
optimization methods to solve such multi-level optimization problems is already an active research area. 
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